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THOSE WHO REMEMBER THE PAST MAY
NOT BE CONDEMNED TO REPEAT IT*
Stephan Landsmant
STAY THE H AND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS. By Gary Jonathan Bass. Princeton: Princeton University

Press. 2000. Pp. 402. $29.95.
THE MEMORY OF JUDGMENT: MAKING LA W AND HISTORY IN THE
TRIALS OF THE HOLOCAUST. By Lawrence Douglas. New Haven:

Yale University Press. 2001. Pp. xiii, 318. $35.
FOR HUMANITY: REFLECTIONS OF A WAR CRIMES INVESTIGATOR.

By Richard J. Goldstone. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2000.
Pp. xxiii, 152. $18.50.
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE.

By Geoffrey Robertson. New York: The New Press. 2000. Pp. xxxiv,
554. $30.

INTRODUCTION

In The Hague, Slobodan Milosevic is on trial for crimes committed
in Bosnia, Kosovo and Croatia;1 in Arusha, Tanzania, Jean Paul
Akayasu, a Rwandan bourgmestre, was convicted of genocide;2 in
London, Augusto Pinochet was detained and adjudged amenable to
an arrest warrant issued by a Spanish magistrate for acts of torture

* This title refers to the famous observation of George Santayana, "Those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it." GEORGE SANTAYANA, 1 THE LIFE OF
REASON (1905-06) quoted in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 703 (15th ed. 1980).
' Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University,

College of Law. B.A. 1969, Kenyon; J.D. 1972, Harvard. - Ed.
1. See Suzanne Daley,
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2002, at A4.

Milosevic Faces Single Trial Asked by Hague Prosecution,

N.Y.

2. See Judgment, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), available at http://222.un.org/ictr/english/
judgments/akayesu.html (a Rwandan bourgmestre is the elected leader of a commune some
thing akin to the mayor of a city).
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carried out in Chile;3 in Belgium, a Hutu Roman Catholic former
mother superior was convicted of complicity in the Rwandan geno
cide;4 and in Rome a treaty was signed commencing the process that
will result in the creation of the International Criminal Court
("ICC").5 All these events underscore the startling growth of efforts to
establish a worldwide criminal process capable of punishing heinous
crimes ranging from genocide to grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions. Though the pace of change has been dramatic over the
past few years, the forces driving it have been building up for at least
half a century.
Each of the four books under review is, in one way or another, de
signed to address the process of transition from a regime of strict na
tional sovereignty and local prosecution of criminal acts to an interna
tional one in which major abuses can and will be punished in courts
around the world. Two of these volumes, Gary Bass's, Stay the Hand
of Vengeance, and Lawrence Douglas's, The Memory of Judgment,
provide excellent scholarly analyses of various historical aspects of the
growth of international criminal prosecution. A third, Justice Richard
Goldstone's, For Humanity, provides the recollections of one of the
architects of transformation about his work as chief prosecutor for the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")6
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR").7 The
fourth book, Geoffrey Robertson's, Crimes Against Humanity, is far
weaker than the others, and presents an idiosyncratic and polemical
assessment of some of the matters addressed in the other volumes.
Part I of this Review examines some of the critical events that have
contributed to the current upsurge in international criminal prosecu
tions. Then each of the four books is discussed. The Review concludes
with two suggestions, one a potentially useful means of explaining why
change has taken place, the other an exploration of the role of truth
commissions in the prosecutorial effort.
I.

THE PAST AS PROLOGUE - TRACING THE UPSURGE IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

While precedent-establishing international prosecution of grave
misconduct had to await the conclusion of the Second World War,
3.

See

ROBERTSON, pp. 388-98.

4. See Marlise Simons, Mother Superior Guilty in Rwandan Killings, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2001, at A4.
5.

See GOLDSTONE,

pp. 120-38.

6. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827
(1993) (approving the Yugoslavia Tribunal).
7. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955
(1994) (approving the Rwanda Tribunal).
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there were rumblings in Europe about the need for some international
mechanism to punish the serious misdeeds of military leaders and
their minions a good deal earlier. In 1815, there were discussions
about prosecuting Napoleon in response to his efforts to subjugate all
of Europe by force of arms.8 Eventually, the British concluded that
such a trial was not worthwhile, although several of Bonaparte's most
famous subordinates, Michel Ney and Charles de la Bedoyere, were
tried and convicted in French courts.9
The idea of using legal prosecution to punish grave misconduct
during armed conflicts was revived during the First World War in re
sponse to two very different problems. The first of these was the
Turkish program carried out during 1915 to murder the Armenian mi
nority within its borders.10 The second was the allegedly unlawful tac
tics adopted by Kaiser Wilhelm II and his generals in their efforts to
secure a German victory over the Allied forces arrayed against them.11
The British were the chief proponents of criminal prosecutions in both
cases.
A. Armenians and Turks
After the Allied victory over the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Britain
pressed the newly installed Turkish government to prosecute, while
His Majesty's Government moved to incarcerate those Turkish lead
ers deemed responsible for the slaughter of as many as 1 ,000,000
Armenians in 1915. This British effort was fueled by strong domestic
antipathy toward the Muslim Turks for their unspeakable barbarity
toward the Armenian Christians. A large number of Turkish leaders
were seized, but the criminal process bogged down both because of
proof problems and concerns over the fairness of the proceedings. As
time dragged on, prosecutorial momentum was lost. Eventually, the
British dramatically reduced the size of their occupation force in the
Ottoman Empire. This had the effect of reducing British authority and
leverage with respect to prosecutions. A group of ardent Turkish Na
tionalists (the "Young Turks"), led by Mustafa Kemal Atattirk, seized
on the issue of prosecutions as one of several grievances warranting
rebellion against the post-war Turkish regime. During the ensuing civil
war, the Nationalists took British hostages. Rather than risk the hos
tages' lives or commit British troops to combat with the Nationalists,
the British government decided to abandon its insistence upon prose8.

See BASS,

9.

See id.

pp. 37-57.

at 39.

10. My discussion of Turkey's genocidal attack on the Armenians and its legal aftermath
is based on BASS, pp. 106-46.
11. My discussion of the Allied efforts to prosecute Wilhelm II and alleged German war
criminals is based on BASS, pp. 58-105.
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cution. The delay in mounting trials, along with Turkish backlash
against British intervention and a lack of complete British military
dominance, all worked to undermine legal action against what may
have been the first twentieth century genocide.
B.

Pursuing the Kaiser

The immense blood letting on the Western Front, the wide-ranging
use of submarine warfare, the Zeppelin attacks from the air on civilian
targets, the use of poison gas, and disregard for the neutral status of a
number of nations all fed an Allied clamoring for the prosecution of
the leaders of the German war effort, most particularly the German
head of state, Kaiser Wilhelm II. The Kaiser, however, fled Germany
at the end of the war and took refuge in the Netherlands, which
granted him asylum. The British and French were outraged and de
manded that Wilhelm be turned over to an international tribunal for
prosecution. These demands were resisted not only by Germany and
the Netherlands, but also by the United States, which proposed an in
ternational commission of inquiry rather than a trial. In the end, the
Kaiser was not prosecuted. Instead, Germany agreed to a small num
ber of war crimes trials to be held before the German Supreme Court
in Leipzig. These cases were a fiasco - either the accused were ac
quitted or given incredibly lenient sentences. Since the Allies had not
occupied Germany at the end of the war, they had no recourse short
of invasion. This choice proved unpalatable, and there the question of
prosecution ended, but not before the experience soured a generation
of British officials (including Winston Churchill) on international
prosecutions and embittered Germans not only against the Allies, but
against the newly established Weimar Republic as well.
C.

Nuremberg

Thus, it was in a historical context of failure and frustration that
debate about prosecution arose during World War II. As the tide of
battle turned against the Nazis, discussions began about post-war
punishment of war criminals. In 1943, representatives of Great Britain,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ( "USSR" ) , and the United
States met in Moscow and declared:
[T]hose German officers and men and members of the Nazi party ...
who have been responsible for ... atrocities, massacres and executions
will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were
done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the
laws of these liberated countries. The above declaration is without preju
dice to the case of the major war criminals whose offenses have no par-
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ticular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint
decision of the governments of the allies.12

While this declaration did not settle precisely how war criminals would
be dealt with, it did contemplate prosecution at the scene of the crime
for lesser criminals as well as some as yet unspecified process for the
newly minted category of "major war criminals."
By mid-1944, the end of the war was in sight and the debate about
the handling of war criminals intensified. In light of their World War I
experience the British, particularly Churchill, pressed for summary
execution of major war criminals. Although some factions of the
American government were sympathetic to this idea, others (centered
around the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson) vigorously opposed any
solution that did not " 'embody . . . at least the rudimentary aspects of
the [American] Bill of Rights, namely notification of the accused of
the charge, the right to be heard and, within reasonable limits, to call
witnesses in his own defense.' "13 Surprisingly, even Stalin opposed the
British on summary executions, declaring " '[t]here must be no execu
tion without trial otherwise the world would say we were afraid to try
them.' "14 What Stalin may have had in mind, however, was not
American-style trials but "show" trials of the sort he stage-managed in
Moscow during the 1930s15 and the Soviets used in Kharkov in
December 1943 to convict three Germans and a Soviet accused of
atrocities.16
After long and difficult negotiations, the American approach was
adopted and the Allies agreed, in the so-called London Agreement
and Charter, to create an International Military Tribunal ("IMT") to
try leading Nazi war criminals.17 Although the tribunal bore the name
"Military," it was not designed or intended as a court martial but
rather as a proceeding with the fundamental attributes of civilian
criminal justice. 18 The first (and only) trial to be conducted by the IMT
took place in Nuremberg, Germany, beginning on November 20, 1945.
This trial had two principal purposes. The first was the traditional one

12. Moscow Declaration of Nov. 1, 1943,
TRIAL OF THE GERMANS 4-5 (1966).

reproduced in

EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE

13. Memorandum from Henry Stimson to John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War
(Sept. 9, 1944) quoted in ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 54 (1983).
14. Letter from Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt (Oct. 22, 1944) (detailing
conversation Churchill had with Stalin) quoted in TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF
THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 31 (1992).
15. For a powerful description and analysis of the Moscow Show Trials, see ROBERT
CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR (1973).
16.

See WHITNEY R.

HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL 6 (1999).

17. The Charter of the International Military Tribunal is reproduced as Appendix A in
TAYLOR, supra note 14, at 645-53.
18.

See JOSEPH

E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG- INFAMY ON TRIAL 464-65 n.34 (1994).
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of punishing top Nazi leaders for the crimes they had personally com
mitted during the Third Reich. The second was something quite dif
ferent. It had little to do with the defendants at all - the goal was to
create an indelible record of Nazi tyranny from 1933 until Germany's
defeat in 1945. As Secretary of War Stimson described this objective,
the trial was to be used as a "way of making a record of the Nazi sys
tem of terrorism and the effort of the Allies to terminate the system
and prevent its recurrence. "19 There were a number of motives behind
this second objective. Churchill, Roosevelt, and other Western leaders
had been obliged, before the start of World War II, to deal with revi
sionist claims about the First World War. In the United States, such
revisionism reinforced a tendency toward isolationism and in Britain,
an inclination toward appeasement. There appeared to be a feeling
among key leaders that such problems should never be allowed to
arise with respect to the Second World War. As Judge Samuel
Rosenman, a Roosevelt confidant, said of his leader:
He was determined that the question of Hitler's guilt - and the guilt of
his gangsters - must not be left open for future debate. The whole nau
seating matter should be spread out on a permanent record under oath
by witnesses and with all the written documents ... In short, there must
never be any question anywhere by anyone about who was responsible
for the war and for the uncivilized war crimes.20

Similar sentiments were echoed by members of Congress and the
American Chief IMT Prosecutor, Supreme Court Justice Robert
Jackson who declared:
Unless we write the record of this movement with clarity and precision,
we cannot blame the future if in days of peace it finds incredible the ac
cusatory generalities uttered during the war. We must establish incredi
ble events by credible evidence.21

There were other reasons as well for the Allied desire that
Nuremberg document the history of the Nazi Reich. Generals
Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton all witnessed firsthand the horrors of
the Nazi concentration camps. They ordered their troops to visit the
camps and directed that German civilians be compelled to go as well.
They believed there should be as many witnesses as possible to the re
ality of the Nazis' crimes. The big picture of Nazi criminality was also
needed to help establish a predicate to punish not only the Nazi hier
archy, but the tens of thousands of Hitler's followers who also commit19. H.L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR
(1947), quoted in 1 DREXEL A. SPRECHER, INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A
PROSECUTOR'S COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 31 (1999).
20. SAMUEL L. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 518-19 (1952),
WILLIAM J. BOSCH, JUDGMENT ON NUREMBERG 25 (1970).

quoted in

21. Report from Robert Jackson to Harry S. Truman (June 7, 1945), quoted in TAYLOR,
note 14, at 54.

supra
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ted serious crimes. A stirring and complete record might serve as a
substitute for painstaking fact-finding in each case. Such a record
could also serve a number of political goals, including homefront
justification of the costly war effort and encouragement of
Soviet/American cooperation in the tense post-war period.
Pursuing the full historical story while at the same time prosecuting
individual criminals is an immensely costly, time-consuming, and diffi
cult task. It requires the tracing of a whole regime's plans, intentions,
and actions as well as those of the accused in the dock. Focusing on
the words and deeds of the defendants alone will not do. In the Nazis'
case, this meant that the life of Adolf Hitler became a central part of
the trial, as did the activities of the Gestapo, Foreign Ministry,
Wehrmacht and a host of other government entities.
The conditions at Nuremberg were uniquely well suited to the
preparation and presentation of an enormous didactic case.22 Almost
every top Nazi official still living was available for interrogation and
prosecution. Both because of the Nazis' own predilections and the
completeness of the Allied victory, the triumphant governments were
in possession of an unprecedented collection of meticulous records
presenting, in the Nazis' own words, the nature and scope of their
crimes. This treasure trove was augmented by a host of films and pho
tographs, making possible a graphic presentation of Nazi atrocities.
Because the Germans had unconditionally surrendered, there was no
government in place to resist anything the Allies chose to do at
Nuremberg. Germany was under firm Allied military control, with no
room left for the sort of organized resistance that arose in Germany at
the time of the Leipzig trials or in Turkey when the British sought the
prosecution of those who massacred the Armenians. The United
States, the most powerful and wealthy country in the world, commit
ted itself fully to the Nuremberg prosecution. America made virtually
unlimited resources available for the scouring of records, preparation
of films, interrogation of witnesses and presentation of a vast historical
case. Both the American and British trial teams were staffed with
gifted advocates, beginning with the enormously eloquent and ener
getic Justice Robert Jackson. Finally, there was no effective defense
bar in place to resist the puissant prosecutorial teams. The German
lawyers asked to represent the defendants had virtually no resources
and had, themselves, just lived through twelve years of numbing Nazi
tyranny.
To pursue the two goals yoked together at Nuremberg, the prose
cuting governments agreed to use an essentially adversarial process
that relied on the parties to generate the evidence and conduct the
22. For a description of the background to, and operation of, the Nuremberg Tribunal,
see TAYLOR, supra note 14. The following assessment of Nuremberg is based, primarily on
Taylor's outstanding work.
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proceedings. This approach served the victors well, allowing the
American government to use its vast resources to prepare the prosecu
tion case while leaving the defendants more or less on their own. The
defendants were forced to do double duty as individuals accused of
specific crimes and as representatives of an evil regime deserving of
condemnation. The trial shifted from a focus on personal responsibil
ity to a recitation of enormous and organized criminality. It grew into
a mammoth nine-month undertaking that generated more than forty
two volumes of evidence and a series of stunning film presentations.
To make its lasting historical record, the Nuremberg prosecution fo
cused not on witnesses but on Nazi documents, a virtually unimpeach
able source. Traditional rules of evidence and procedure were aban
doned so that the complex story could be told unimpeded by
traditional constraints regarding relevance, hearsay, and authentica
tion.
Nuremberg is the seminal event in post-World War II international
criminal justice. It is the precedent upon which all ensuing develop
ments are based. In large measure, this is due to the widely shared
perception that Nuremberg worked. The Nazis convicted at
Nuremberg clearly deserved condemnation and the didactic record the
Allies produced has withstood the test of time. This has led more re
cent prosecutors and legislators to see Nuremberg as an appropriate
model for emulation. Nuremberg's success bolstered the belief that
vast narratives of governmental bestiality can be presented in sprawl
ing trials, with the interests of individual criminal defendants properly
respected. In Nuremberg's wake, it has become acceptable to assume
that both didactic and individual goals can be met in the same pro
ceeding.
What may not be clear from a cursory look at Nuremberg is that it
succeeded because of the incredibly advantageous conditions in which
the trial was held, and due to the outstanding fairness and care of the
judges, most particularly the IMT's President, Sir Geoffrey Lawrence.
Many of the safeguards that ensure the integrity of adversary pro
ceedings were abandoned at Nuremberg. The defendants were pro
vided inexperienced and underfunded counsel. The protections af
forded by a host of evidence rules were put aside. There was no
arrangement for appellate review and there was intense pressure for a
speedy resolution of the case. The main targets of the prosecution
were not the defendants, but rather such monsters as Hitler, Himmler
and Goebbels. The men in the dock were, frequently, little more than
stand-ins. It is truly remarkable that the Nuremberg trial succeeded in
doing and appearing to do justice, rather than getting sidetracked by
prejudice and the temptation to treat the accused as fall guys. The
Tribunal displayed a nuanced appreciation of the individual defen
dants' positions when it acquitted three of them and sentenced a num
ber of others relatively leniently. Despite the Soviet view that indict-
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ment was tantamount to conviction and that conviction always war
ranted death, the Tribunal majority differentiated and showed careful
judgment.
Several other aspects of the work of the IMT are worth noting.
The didactic case prepared and presented, in large measure, by the
American prosecutors was not primarily focused on the Holocaust.
Rather, it conceived of military aggression as the Nazis' chief crime.
The Americans worked to show unlawful aggression by producing
thousands of German government documents - so many in fact that
Lord Justice Lawrence eventually imposed limitations to ensure that
the Tribunal and defense would not be overwhelmed. At that mo
ment, the Americans, sensing a loss of momentum and credibility,
turned from their documentary tale of aggression to proof of atrocity
and, inadvertently, the Holocaust. This "new" evidence, most par
ticularly a film entitled Nazi Concentration Camps, was riveting, re
stored prosecutorial momentum, and regained the moral high ground
for the prosecution. The Americans would return to atrocity evidence
to revive flagging fortunes several more times while the French and
Soviet prosecution teams would make such matters the core issue of
their cases. Nuremberg displayed to the world and prosecutors j ust
how affecting and persuasive Holocaust evidence could be and
thereby bound future trials to such materials. In presenting an enor
mous and horror-filled case, Nuremberg raised the stakes of interna
tional criminal prosecutions. Any failure at Nuremberg would have
been perceived as a devastating blow, discrediting the Allies' view of
history and their claims of Nazi barbarity. The two-track approach re
sulted in a high-stakes gamble.
D. Eichmann
Nuremberg was the bedrock upon which was built the next great
international23 criminal prosecution - the 1960 trial before an Israeli
court of the Nazi architect of the Western European Holocaust, Adolf
Eichmann.24 Nuremberg served as precedent that Israel's prosecutor,
Gideon Hausner, viewed as essential. He stated that in preparation for
the trial he "consumed [the forty-two-volume record of Nuremberg] at
the rate of a volume per day."25 The whole Nuremberg record was
eventually placed in evidence at Eichmann's trial.

23. "International" is here used in the sense of a trial taking place in one nation but con
sidering events in another.
24. For a description of how Eichmann was kidnapped from Argentina and brought be
fore the court in Jerusalem, see ISSER HAREL, THE HOUSE ON GARIBALDI STREET (1975).
25. GIDEON HAUSNER, JUSTICE IN JERUSALEM 290 (1966). Unless otherwise noted, my
analysis of the Eichmann case will be based on the factual material set forth in Hausner's
work.
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Like Nuremberg, Eichmann was conceived not simply as a criminal
prosecution but as an opportunity for a didactic proceeding - one
that could present the entire story of the Jewish Holocaust, which
Nuremberg itself only incompletely addressed. David Ben Gurion, the
Israeli Prime Minister, in a letter to the World Zionist Organization,
wrote:
The Holocaust that the Nazis wreaked on the Jewish people is not like
other atrocities that the Nazis committed in the world, but a unique epi
sode that has no equal, an attempt to totally destroy the Jewish people,
which Hitler and his helpers did not dare try with any other nation. It is
the particular duty of the State of Israel, the Jewish people's only sover
eign entity, to recount this episode in its full magnitude and horror; with
out ignoring the Nazi regime's other crimes against humanity - but not
as one of these crimes, rather as the only crime that has no parallel in
26
human history.

Hausner shared these views and wrote in his book on the case:
There was, in fact, much more to it than a desire for a complete record.I
wanted our people at home to know as many of the facts of the great dis
aster as could be legitimately conveyed through these proceedings. It was
imperative for the stability of our youth that they should learn the full
truth of what had happened, for only through knowledge could under
standing and reconciliation with the past be achieved. Our younger gen
eration, absorbed as it was in the building and guarding of the new state,
had far too little insight into events which ought to be a pivotal point in
its education. The teenagers of Israel, most of them born into statehood
or during the struggle for it, had no real knowledge, and theref ore no ap
preciation, of the way in which their own flesh and blood had perished.
There was here a breach between the generations, a possible source of an
abhorrence of the nation's yesterday. This could be removed only by fac
27

tual enlightenment.

By committing the Eichmann prosecution to telling the full story of
the Jewish Holocaust, the Israelis embraced the two-track strategy of
Nuremberg and expanded its reach by focusing on a lower level (al
though still significant) official brought to trial long after the war
ended. The Israelis' motivations included a desire to challenge the im
pression that Europe's Jews had gone meekly to their slaughter. To
this end, the prosecution sought to emphasize the heroism of the
Jewish victims. Rachel Auerbach of Yad Vashem (the official
Holocaust memorial institution of Israel) served as an adviser to the
prosecution team. She outlined the sorts of witnesses who ought to be
called including, most particularly, those who could describe "deeds of

26.
1993).

Quoted

in TOM SEGEV, THE SEVENTH MILLION 329-30 (Haim Watzman trans.,

27. HAUSNER, supra note 25, at 291-92.
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self-sacrifice, resistance, rebellion, revenge, and flight." 28 Auerbach's
approach was adopted.
Although the Eichmann prosecution did not have all the advan
tages that the Allies had at Nuremberg, the Israelis still found them
selves in a situation that might facilitate a big didactic trial. The defen
dant, while not a leading Nazi, was a significant functionary in the
ministry that had arranged the deaths of millions of Jews. He was a
criminal of the sort who, doubtless, warranted the most severe pun
ishment. Eichmann's work had generated a vast body of incriminating
evidence. There was no doubt about his identity or his guilt. Docu
ments and witnesses were available in abundance to prove his connec
tion to murderous operations on an unimaginable scale. Moreover,
Eichmann, like his more illustrious Nuremberg Nazi brethren, was a
man with no real political protectors. He was not being tried on his
home turf and lacked connections with any nation willing to act on his
behalf or protect the ideas with which he was associated. He faced
prosecution by a modern nation-state with relatively large resources
available to prepare its case. Eventually, Eichmann would be de
fended by one of the same lawyers, Dr. Robert Servatius, who handled
the cases of a number of Nuremberg defendants. Servatius had ab
sorbed the quiescent and cooperative style of other Nuremberg de
fense counsel. He did not set out to challenge the Holocaust or dis
credit its victims. Moreover, he was a continental lawyer unschooled in
the adversarial art of cross-examination.
Eichmann's trial conformed to the Nuremberg pattern. It relied on
precisely the same sort of adversarial approach utilized by the Allies in
1945. The Israeli trial court heard evidence that ranged over the en
tirety of the Holocaust, from early anti-Semitic activities like the
Nuremberg race laws and Kristallnacht, to the murderous mass kill
ings in the East by the mobile killing units (Einsatzgruppen) and the
operations of the death camps at Auschwitz, Sobibor, Treblinka and
the rest. The prosecution incorporated this, and a great deal more, in
its vast fifteen count indictment, diligently pursuing two tracks. The
first focused on Eichmann. The second encompassed an enormous
flood of Holocaust materials that had nothing to do with the defen
dant in the protective glass booth. Weeks were spent on the
Einsatzgruppen and Operation Reinhard (the organized murder of
Poland's Jews). Eichmann was not demonstrably connected to either
of these criminal activities. Still, the prosecution plowed on. In the
end, for one middle rank Nazi official, there were 1400 documentary
exhibits (some of them stretching to many thousands of pages), 121
prosecution witnesses and ten months of hearings. The witnesses were
a new addition to the two-track didactic criminal prosecution. At

28. SEGEV, supra note 26, at 339.
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Nuremberg, prosecutors called only thirty-three live witnesses. The
Eichmann court adopted a virtually identical approach to evidentiary
questions as had its forebear. Relevance restrictions were few; hearsay
flooded in; and authentication requirements were loosened.
As had been the case at Nuremberg, the Jerusalem trial generally
came to be viewed as a legitimate exercise of legal authority, as well as
the producer of a compelling narrative about the Holocaust. Again,
however, a dangerously expanded and vulnerable process was saved
from potential problems by the intervention of a particularly vigorous
and fair-minded judge, Supreme Court Justice Moshe Landau, who
worked tirelessly to keep the proceedings on track. That his achieve
ment was both difficult and significant is suggested by the abject fail
ure of one of his colleagues on the Eichmann bench, Benjamin Halevi,
to manage effectively an earlier Holocaust-related matter involving a
libel accusation regarding a former Hungarian Jewish official. 29 Part of
the reason for Landau's sedulous care may have been the fact that
Eichmann had been illegally kidnapped from his hideout in Argentina
by Israeli intelligence agents and, at the beginning of the case, the
world community was highly critical of Israel's action. For whatever
reason, Landau vigorously policed the proceeding, managing to keep
it from tilting into damaging excess. At the end of the case, the judges,
led by Landau, drafted a judgment that refused to treat Eichmann as
the superhuman monster the prosecution had sought to depict and
weighed the evidence presented in an evenhanded and persuasive
manner.
The Eichmann case did more than simply mirror Nuremberg. It
redefined the focus of such cases and incorporated a broader array of
evidence (most particularly that from victim witnesses). The atrocity
materials that had inadvertently become so important at Nuremberg
were the conscious heart and soul of the proceedings in Jerusalem.
The Holocaust's evidentiary power was grasped and used not simply
to resolve prosecutorial trial problems, but as the raison d'etre of the
case. To prove the Holocaust, the Nuremberg documents and films
were augmented with the testimony of scores of witnesses. These wit
nesses presented a number of problems. Some were so emotionally or
psychologically damaged as to prove incapable of testifying compe
tently. One fainted on the witness stand and could not continue.30 An
other was assailed by health problems before testifying and failed to
respond to court directions once on the witness stand.31 Some wit
nesses appeared to use the process to attempt to strike questionable
29.

See

DOUGLAS, p. 156.

30. 3 THE TRIAL OF ADOLF EICHMANN - RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 1237 (Eng.
Trans. 1993) (hereinafter EICHMANN RECORD] (testimony of Yehiel Dinur).
31. 1 EICHMANN RECORD,
ska).

supra

note 30, at 499, 517-18 (testimony of Rivka Yoselew
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blows at Eichmann.32 Others seemed out to advance their political ca
reers33 or literary ambitions.34 All faced difficulties related to the, at
least, fifteen year hiatus from the time of the Holocaust to the begin
ning of the trial.
The Eichmann prosecution's vast two-track approach had a dis
torting effect on the trial. At least one third of the proof (all that con
cerning the Einsatzgruppen, Operation Reinhard in Poland, the op
eration of specific concentration camps and the rise of pre-war
German anti-Semitism) had nothing to do with Eichmann at all. This
meant that something like 40 of the 121 prosecution witnesses were
literally irrelevant to the case against the defendant. When documen
tary evidence, films, and photographs are considered, perhaps as much
as half the prosecution's case was irrelevant. Not only was much of the
proof irrelevant, the prosecution's conception of Eichmann was in
flammatory and distorted. The prosecution chose to argue that
Eichmann was second only to Hitler in responsibility for the
Holocaust. This claim was patently ridiculous. Eichmann had been a
mid-level functionary. Ranged above him were the great monsters of
the Third Reich including Himmler, Heydrich, Bormann, Frank, Hoss
and the rest. Eichmann was a murderous bureaucrat, not a blood
spattered monster.35
The stakes the Israelis risked in trying Eichmann in the manner
they did were enormous. By abducting the defendant from Argentina,
Israel had challenged the world political order. If Eichmann were ex
onerated, or Israel shown to be a lawless state willing to indulge in a
fraudulent show trial, the consequence would have been international
ostracism. Moreover, if Eichmann were not persuasively proven guilty,
the entire Israeli effort to have the Holocaust taken more seriously,
both at home and abroad, would have been profoundly damaged.
Mounting this enormous two-track prosecution meant risk of the most
substantial sort, as well as enormous financial expense.

32. 1 EICHMANN RECORD, supra note 30, at 455-66 (testimony of Abba Kovner sprin
kled with improbable and emotion-laden material aimed at damning Eichmann).
33. 3 EICHMANN RECORD, supra note 30, at 1123-27 (testimony of Zvi Zimmerman, a
member of Parliament, found to have virtually no relevance to the case).
34. 2 EICHMANN RECORD, supra note 30, at 709 (testimony of American judge Michael
Musmanno described by defense counsel as "a publicist traveling from place to place gath
ering material with a view to publication").
35. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM
A REPORT ON THE
BANALITY OF EVIL (1963). Arendt's account of the Eichmann trial, however, has come un
der serious criticism. See JACOB ROBINSON, AND THE CROOKED SHALL BE MADE
STRAIGHT (1965).
-
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Demjanjuk

The Nuremberg two-track approach was not abandoned after
Eichmann. Rather, it was refined and expanded upon when Israel re

turned to the question of Holocaust criminality in the trial of John
Demjanjuk in 1987.36 Demjanjuk was accused of having been Ivan
"Grozny,"37 the particularly vicious operator of the gas chamber appa
ratus at the Treblinka death camp in Poland during the Second World
War. After lengthy denaturalization and extradition proceedings in
the United States (where Demjanjuk had been living for many years),
the defendant was extradited to Israel for trial. Both the United States
and Israel appeared hopeful that Demjanjuk's prosecution and convic
tion would usher in a new era in which Nazi murderers would finally
(more than thirty-five years after the end of World War II) be pun
ished for their crimes.38 This increased desire to see Holocaust crimi
nals punished was a reflection of changing attitudes in both the United
States and Israel.39 The attractiveness of prosecution was enhanced by
the fact that the passage of time was rapidly thinning the ranks of
Holocaust survivors who could identify criminals and provide live tes
timony at their trials. As Michael Shaked, one of the Israeli prosecu
tors, declared in his opening remarks:
There can be no doubt, this may be one of the last trials where it is possi
ble to bring to the stand witnesses who can say, "We were there, we saw
what happened with our own eyes. We can testify as to what hap
pened."40

The Demjanjuk prosecution was also, at least in part, motivated by an
Israeli desire to distract attention from the Palestinian Intifada then
raging, by re-presenting the story of the Jews' suffering at the hands of
the Nazis. With all this in mind, it is not hard to see why the two-track
grand narrative approach pioneered at Nuremberg and refined in
Eichmann was again deployed.
Unfortunately, Demjanjuk was not the sort of case that could eas
ily support such an approach. Ivan the Terrible, whoever he was, was
not a major figure in, or architect of, the Holocaust. He was simply
one of its bestial foot soldiers. In contrast to prior cases, the
Demjanjuk pretrial investigative work was slipshod and incomplete emblematic of the case's start as a relatively minor matter. The victim
witnesses who were relied upon for identifications had been handled

36. Unless otherwise noted, my analysis of the Demjanjuk case will be based on the factual material set forth in TOM TEICHOLZ, THE TRIAL OF IV AN THE TERRIBLE (1990).
37. "Grozny" translates into English as "Ivan the Terrible." Id.
38.

See DEMJANJUK V.

39.

See

PETROVSKY, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER 146-47 (1993).

40.

Quoted in TEICHOLZ, supra

ALLAN A. RYAN, JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS (1984).
note 36, at 103.
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in a careless manner (particularly with respect to suggestive photo ar
rays) that substantially increased the risk of erroneous identification.41
The American prosecutors, who conducted much. of the preliminary
investigation (in support of their denaturalization effort), employed a
narrowly focused "hardball" approach to the proof that deprived the
defense of critical information and lent a misleading air of certainty to
the case.42• There were no document troves from which to cull damn
ing evidence. In fact, there was only one document that directly con�
nected Demjanjuk with the death camps, the Trawniki camp identity
card. This card did not even tie Demjanjuk to Treblinka but rather to
a different death camp, Sobibor. That Demjanjuk was not tried until
more than 40 years after the end of World War II only added to the
difficulty. This meant that memories had likely faded and all available
witnesses were likely exposed to a variety of suggestive experiences,
including testimony at prior trials, exposure to media reports, partici
pation in various memorial activities, as well as tainted investigative
efforts. Finally, the quiescent defense counsel who had generally been
in charge at Nuremberg and during Eichmann's case had been re
placed by aggressive, publicity hungry American and Israeli advocates
well versed in adversarial techniques, if not the evidence in the
Demjanjuk case. The cooperative spirit with which the earlier trials
had been managed no longer existed. Instead, a resounding clash be
tween prosecution and defense could be expected.
The special three-judge Israeli court that tried Demjanjuk followed
in the footsteps of its two-track predecessors. The adversarial burden
to produce evidence was placed squarely on the shoulders of the par
ties. The prosecution sought, once again, to present a narrative of the
Holocaust. To this end, it used materials presented at previous trials,
elaborate expert analyses and a great deal of victim witness testimony.
The prosecutors went about their job with the utmost zeal. They cast
Demjanjuk in the role of villainous mass murderer. In their zeal, they
seemed to ignore the possibility that Demjanjuk was not Ivan the
Terrible. The court used the same loose approach to evidence that had
been adopted in Nuremberg and Eichmann. Relevance was ignored,
hearsay embraced and authentication requirements abandoned. Even
cautionary rules designed to ensure the integrity of eyewitness identi
fications were disregarded. The court, as a matter of principle,
adopted the view that the victim witnesses had suffered so deep a
trauma that it was impossible for them to forget their experiences or
the identity of their tormentors.

41. See WILLEM A. WAGENAAR, IDENTIFYING IVAN: A CASE STUDY IN LEGAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1988).
42.

See

Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F. 3d 338 (1993).
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The resulting trial was a sprawling and contentious affair that ran
for more than a year. Unfortunately, there was no great judge to guide
and protect the proceedings. The pedestrian panel hearing the case
placed excessive reliance on the victim witnesses and was eventually
shown to have misbehaved in its relations with the press. Despite sev
eral warning signals, the court wholeheartedly embraced the proof
suggesting that Demjanjuk was Ivan the Terrible and dismissed out of
hand anything pointing in the other direction. The prosecution's zeal
knew no bounds. Prosecutors seized virtually every available opportu
nity to strike blows at both the defendant and his counsel - including
the incendiary accusation that the defense and some of its witnesses
were associated with Holocaust denial groups. The prosecutors
painted the defendant as a monster of the most profound depravity.
No opportunity to attack his character was missed.
Demjanjuk's defense team, particularly its two American mem
bers, was simply inadequate to the task of representing the target of so
vast and controversial a case. Their interrogation of victim witnesses
was insensitive and infuriated both onlookers and the court. The ex
perts they called were, for the most part, shown to be charlatans or in
competents. They dismissed evidentiary sources (particularly those
from behind the Iron Curtain) that would eventually prove critical to
the case. They were so distracted by the media coverage of the trial
that they often lost sight of their client's best interests. As the trial
progressed, the pressures of the case, and their lack of adequate skill
and preparation, led Demjanjuk's American lawyers to veer toward
simplistic claims tinged with Holocaust denial. When the trial eventu
ally spun out of control, the Demjanjuk family decided to fire the
American lawyers and place their full reliance on Yoram Sheftel, the
sole Israeli advocate on the team. Sheftel, while clearly more compe
tent, was not particularly effective. He was so combative that he even
tually came to be viewed as perhaps the most hated man in Israel.43
While the defense team's weaknesses caused much of its difficulty, the
pressures generated in resisting a two-track didactic prosecution are
likely to push even the best of defenders into denial of historical facts
and victim denigration.
The result of all this was a travesty of justice. The court convicted
Demjanjuk and wrote an opinion it declared to be a tribute to the vic
tims of the Holocaust, "a monument to their souls, to the holy congre
gations that were lost and are no more, to those who were annihi
lated. "44 All doubts and questions were summarily swept aside in the
fervor to pay homage.

43. See YORAM SHEFTEL,

DEFENDING IVAN THE TERRIBLE (1996).

44. THE DEMJANJUK TRIAL 39 (Asher Felix Landau ed., 1991).
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Demjanjuk appealed his conviction and as the case ground slowly
ahead, evidence raising the most serious questions about the accuracy
of the decision began to surface. Witnesses came forward to say that
Ivan the Terrible was really a man named Marchenko. Others pre
sented proof that Demjanjuk had been stationed at Sobibor and a
number of other camps, but never at Treblinka. Information became
available that the identifications relied upon by the Jerusalem District
Court were tainted and might be erroneous. Eventually, the Supreme
Court of Israel declared that the conviction was unsound, had to be
reversed, and Demjanjuk freed. There was a public outcry in Israel
because a man shown to have been a camp guard was being released,
however, the lack of clear proof and the appearance of judicial blun
der seemed to foreclose any other choice. The failure of the Demjan
juk prosecution struck a fatal blow to Holocaust prosecutions in Israel
- there would be no more. The stakes had been raised so high that
there was no way to go on once the Demjanjuk effort was discredited.
The miscarriage of justice produced by too light a regard for basic
safeguards about evidence and identifications had destroyed the le
gitimacy of the prosecutorial effort.
Despite the Demjanjuk disaster, the two-track didactic case model
invented at Nuremberg has not been abandoned. It was used with dis
astrous consequences in the Canadian trial and acquittal of Imre Fin ta,
a Hungarian Gendarme Captain allegedly responsible for the loading
of Jews onto trains bound for the extermination camps.45 Far more se
riously, it has been used as the model for the early prosecutions
mounted by the ICTY and ICTR. The first full-scale trial at the ICTY,
that of Dusko Tactic, was marked by a strikingly similar approach.46
The trial in that case dragged on for more than a year, focused more
on Serb policy than on the defendant, utilized exceedingly lax rules of
evidence and eventually faced extremely serious witness problems, in
cluding the demonstrated perjury of a witness introduced into the pro
ceedings through the machinations of the Bosnian Muslim govern
ment. While Tactic was properly convicted, the process used holds
little promise of becoming an effective and reliable prosecutorial
mechanism. There were similar difficulties in the ICTR trial of Jean
Paul Akayasu.47 Even the Rome treaty outlining the nature of the In
ternational Criminal Court seems to contemplate a Nuremberg-like
process with didactic trials, loose evidence rules, and robustly adver-

45. R. v. lmre Finta, 1994 S.C.R. 265 (Can.).
46. My discussion of the Tadic case is based upon MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN
JUSTICE (1997).
47. See Judgment, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998 Interna
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda), available at http://222.un.org/ictr/english/judgments/
akayesu.html.
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sarial procedures.48 Nuremberg was a powerful and positive precedent
in international law. It has, however, had a decidedly negative impact
on international criminal procedure, inhibiting development of a more
effective, efficient and careful sort of courtroom process. Such an ap
proach heightens not only the risk of failure but also the cost of fail
ure. Even success can come with a prohibitively high price tag.
II.

B ASS, DOUGLAS, GOLDSTONE AND ROBERTSON

A.

Bass

Gary B ass has written a first rate scholarly volume about when and
why international tribunals are likely to succeed. At the heart of his
book are five case studies including both successful and failed prosecu
torial efforts. Among the former are Nuremberg and the ICTY, while
the latter include international efforts to deal with Napoleon, Kaiser
Wilhelm II, and the Turkish leaders responsible for the Armenian
massacres. These nuanced and detailed historical studies forcefully
remind the reader of the point made by George Santayana that
"[t]hose who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it."49
Bass helps us remember this particular and important past, thereby in
creasing the likelihood that we may learn from it in pursuing interna
tional justice in the future.
Bass argues that liberal states are not always likely to support in
ternational tribunals. They will sometimes, however, be willing to do
so. Understanding when is key to assessing the likelihood of a tribu
nal's success. On the basis of his five case studies, Bass concludes that
prosecution is most likely to work if three critical conditions are met.
His first and second conditions emphasize the "selfish" concerns of
potential prosecutors about the welfare of their own citizens. If resis
tance to arrests or trials is likely to lead to a significant risk that sol
diers or civilians of the prosecuting nations will be injured, then the
prospects for trial are dramatically reduced. Conversely, if the crimes
charged arise out of the infliction of serious harm on soldiers or civil
ians of the prosecuting nations then the chances for trial are substan
tially enhanced. Bass's third point is that prosecution is often tied to
political sentiment in the prosecuting nations. If a wide segment of the
populace shares a sense of outrage about an alleged crime, prosecu
tion is far more likely. While none of these points is meant to be an
ironclad rule, together they have substantial explanatory power with
respect to Bass's case studies. Prosecution failed in Turkey and was
placed in serious jeopardy at the ICTY because the Western democra48. See Leila Madya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court:
An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381 (2000).
49. See

SANTAYANA, supra note *.
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cies faced risks to their own troops and citizens in making arrests and
conducting trials. The prospects for prosecution were boosted at
Nuremberg because there were no such risks, and because the Nazis
had committed heinous acts that affected the citizens of all the nations
involved in the IMT.
Stay the Hand of Vengeance is strongest on the historical back
ground to the trials and trial efforts examined. The book is full of in
teresting and illuminating insights about the politics that surrounded
each case. Bass presents a great deal of little known information about
the .treatment of the defeated Napoleon - especially about the pro
tective role played by the Duke of Wellington with respect to his de
feated adversary. Perhaps the strongest and saddest section of the
book considers the failed prosecution of the perpetrators of the
Armenian genocide. The consequences of that failure reverberate to
this day. Bass traverses more familiar ground with respect to
Nuremberg and the ICTY but still uncovers valuable information.
About Nuremberg, Bass informs us that its key American sponsor,
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, was not only motivated by
his sense of fair play in insisting upon trials but by a "genteel
antisemit[ism]" (p. 174) that led him to oppose the draconian propos
als of the Jewish Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, Jr. With re
spect to the ICTY, Bass reminds us that its creation was an admission
of Western failure to stop a clearly identified human rights catastro
phe, and that it was saved from ignominious failure, in good measure,
by the courageous and skillful efforts of several American diplomats
including most particularly "the mother of all tribunals," (p. 262)
Madeleine Albright.
Bass's book does not assign itself the task of looking closely at the
trials that were the results of consummated international agreements
to prosecute. His position seems to be that such trials can be very im
portant because they may "help bring out the truth" (p. 144). He does
not address the problems inherent in such trials when they become
lengthy recitations of general history. He does, however, note the par
ticular problems raised by the prosecution of Dusko Tadic in the
ICTY, a case that focused on an insignificant defendant of no real im
portance in the Balkans drama. Bass remarks on the incredible slow
ness of that trial, its reliance on marginal evidence, and the prosecu
tors' need to abandon certain charges and renounce the testimony of
certain witnesses.
B.

Douglas

Lawrence Douglas in The Memory of Judgment, does concern him
self with an examination of the details of several international criminal
prosecutions. His book, like Bass's, is anchored in a series of powerful
and well-researched case studies including the Nuremberg trial, as well
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as those of Adolf Eichmann and John Demjanjuk.50 Douglas's objec
tive is to examine whether trials, most particularly those involving the
events of the Holocaust, can serve more than just the "juridical"
(p. 174) goal of proving the guilt or innocence of an accused defen
dant. Douglas asks whether the didactic two-track trial born at Nur
emberg can serve a number of grander social objectives including the
creation of a lasting historical record, the achievement of "collective
catharsis" (p. 1 10), and the establishment of "heroic memory"
(p. 154). He takes the position that trials about the Holocaust have
successfully served all these ends and rejects the notion that trials
should be strictly juridical.
Douglas begins his work with a careful analysis of the background
to, and proof used at, the Nuremberg trial. He pays particular atten
tion to the American prosecution film, Nazi Concentration Camps.
Douglas, however, reminds us that Nuremberg did not start as a
Holocaust or atrocity case but, instead, was conceived primarily as an
effort to punish Nazi militarism and crimes against peace. As a result
the main evidentiary focus (at least by the Americans) was Nazi ag
gression rather than the plight of the victims of atrocities. To serve
that end, the American team sought to present a huge array of Nazi
documents while relegating live witnesses (most particularly victims)
to a far inferior position. Douglas stresses the transformative impact of
Nazi Concentration Camps and other atrocity evidence. He nicely
demonstrates the dramatic shift in focus as displayed in the closing ar
gument of the chief British prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross. Instead
of pursuing the earlier themes of the British case, Shawcross concen
trated on a heart-rending affidavit written by Hermann Grabe de
scribing the slaughter of innocent Jewish men, women, and children by
a Nazi death squad. Douglas says of this speech: "It was as if the
prosecution itself had finally absorbed the significance of its own ter
rible evidence and, in so doing, had come to recognize the insufficien
cies of the legal case meant to contain it" (p. 93). Douglas argues that
the experience of the Nuremberg trial reoriented international prose
cution and infused it with a concern to remember and memorialize the
Holocaust.
The Memory of Judgment presents this transformation as an ap
propriate one that eventually resulted in the Eichmann prosecution
where Holocaust memorialization moved to the acknowledged center
of the trial. The didactic elements of the case were recognized and
embraced by an extremely zealous Israeli prosecution team and sub
stantially strengthened by the use of 121 live witnesses - most of
them Holocaust survivors. The goal was not simply to convict
Eichmann but to address the terrible trauma caused by the Holocaust
50. Douglas also focuses on the Canadian trial of a Holocaust denier named Ernst
Zundel. Pp. 212-13.
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and rehabilitate the reputation of its victims. This project clashed with
traditional notions of relevance and led to sharp clashes between the
court {which sought traditional juridical goals) and the prosecution
{which labored mightily to tell the whole Holocaust story). Douglas
finds that the efforts of court and prosecution balanced each other and
resulted in a case that was both effective in convicting Eichmann and
capable of addressing the Holocaust, in other words, a trial record that
could "condemn the accused and . . . acquit his victims" (p. 154). It was
also a record that could kindle interest in Holocaust prosecutions
around the world.
This well-reasoned'and thoughtful analysis of the Eichmann case is
far from uncontroversial. As early as the time of the trial itself, power
fully intelligent critics like Telford Taylor and Hannah Arendt were
sharply critical of Israel's approach. Arendt in particular was disturbed
by Israel's adoption of the two-track approach, viewing it as a betrayal
of the juridical mission. While Douglas presents forceful counters to
Arendt's arguments, one cannot help but recall that Eichmann set the
pattern that would result in the Demjanjuk debacle. Douglas seeks to
address Demjanjuk by suggesting that the court took the didactic ef
fort too far. It is hard to see how such a problem can be avoided ex
cept by extraordinarily sensitive and fairminded judges. The risk of ju
dicial bias and hazard of distraction {because of a parade of
irrelevancies) are inherent in the two-track approach. Moreover, as
Douglas points out, errors "in trials staged as didactic spectacles, ritu
als of justice designed to place the institutions of criminal justice in the
fore of the public's mind . . . seem more consequential" {p. 206). In
fact, Demjanjuk not only brought Israeli Holocaust prosecutions to an
end but, Douglas suggests, may even have helped fuel Holocaust de
nial since it is a short step from witness errors about Ivan the Terrible
to witness mistakes about the Holocaust itself.
Douglas goes on to look at other cases affected by Holocaust
related issues. He particularly focuses on a Canadian case involving a
Holocaust denier named Ernst Zundel (pp. 212-13). Even here, out
side the realm of crimes committed during the Holocaust, the prob
lems of the two-track didactic trial can be observed. The Canadian
courts that considered the Zundel case were unsettled for years by the
myriad of evidentiary problems generated. Although the Eichmann
case may have been "an extraordinary success" (p. 260), in many ways,
it was also an invitation to the development of courtroom processes
and attitudes that became increasingly unmanageable, unpredictable,
and unsatisfactory. The course that yielded the Demjanjuk disaster
was charted in Eichmann. The law grows by experience and prece
dent. Where Eichmann pointed, Demjanjuk and other cases followed,
creating an ever more fragile, costly, and risky process.
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Goldstone

In 1994, Richard Goldstone was chosen to be chief prosecutor of
the ICTY. He was selected after a great deal of political wrangling in
circumstances that raised substantial doubts about whether interna
tional prosecution in the Balkans could succeed. In significant part due
to his efforts, the ICTY shifted from an aspirational entity with few
cases to a serious instrument of justice. In his memoir, For Humanity,
Goldstone describes the process leading to the ICTY's transformation
and also provides a number of insights on the progress of democracy
and justice in Goldstone's native South Africa.
One of the things that Goldstone's memoir makes quite clear is the
impact of the Nuremberg precedent on the formation of the ICTY and
the thinking of its chief prosecutor. At the outset of his discussion of
the ICTY, Goldstone notes "the importance of the legacy of the
Nuremberg trials" (p. 75). He describes its holdings about jurisdiction
and crimes against humanity as fundamental. He embraces
Nuremberg's two-track approach most particularly with respect to the
creation of a historical record in the courtroom. The connection be
tween the ICTY and Nuremberg also comes through strongly when
Goldstone discusses why a tribunal was created with respect to
Yugoslavia but not in the aftermath of the war in Iraq. Judge
Goldstone begins by pointing out that Yugoslavian ethnic cleansing
reminded the Western community of the Holocaust, and that photos
of the Bosnian prison camps were uncomfortably similar to those
made infamous at Nuremberg. All of this - and the European loca
tion of the Balkan atrocities - challenged the Western democracies
on their home ground with a vile Nazi-style racism of the sort that had
been condemned in 1945. The absence of these factors with respect to
Iraq made it appear a far less appealing venue for the creation of a
lasting historical record by means of an international tribunal.
Goldstone's book is particularly illuminating regarding the difficul
ties in getting an international prosecution under way. He identifies a
number of problems that must be resolved. Perhaps foremost among
these is the organizational effort required to build up a prosecutor's
office. By Goldstone's estimate, such an effort takes at least 18
months. Delay of the sort required to accomplish such a project erodes
credibility and increases evidence-gathering problems. Evidence gath
ering presents other difficulties as well. To effectively prosecute high
ranking defendants, let alone present a grand historical narrative, re
quires a significant supply of evidentiary information. To get that in
formation requires international cooperation. In the case of the ICTY,
Goldstone concluded that he needed a significant volume of informa
tion from American and British intelligence sources. The CIA and
others were loath to turn such information over and a protracted insti
tutional battle with friendly governments ensued. The same sort of
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problems arose with respect to the willingness of NATO forces to ar
rest those indicted by the ICTY. It was only after extensive struggle
and political shifts that any significant number of defendants was
taken into custody.
Goldstone highlights a number of other institutional problems as
well. International prosecutions on a grand scale demand a grand
budget. Securing such a budget is a politically daunting task.
Goldstone describes in detail his budget battles with a United Nations
("UN") bureaucracy that did not want to fund the prosecutorial effort
adequately and sought to use funding as an instrument of control. The
judges appointed to the ICTY also threatened prosecutorial inde
pendence. Many of them were the products of inquisitorial rather than
adversarial justice systems. In the former, courts often have the power
to direct and manage prosecutorial operations. Despite the adversary
nature of the rules of the ICTY, a number of judges sought to impose
their views about the pace and scope of prosecution on Goldstone's
office. The chief prosecutor's memoirs suggest just how political the
commencement of international prosecution can be. Goldstone,
schooled in the task of transitional justice by his experiences in South
Africa, was up to the task of making the ICTY a real and functioning
prosecutorial mechanism. He, however, needed a great deal of help.
Among his allies were the American diplomats Madeleine Albright
and David Scheffer. Goldstone left the ICTY to return to South
Africa before the prosecutors in The Hague had mounted many cases.
His memoirs provide valuable insights into the struggles and difficul
ties of setting up an effective international justice mechanism.
D. Robertson
Geoffrey Robertson's book is an extended effort to chart the rise
of crimes against humanity as a prosecutable offense. Unfortunately, it
is not carefully grounded in history, and seems to have been written
more as a polemic than as scholarly work. Both Bass and Douglas are
painstakingly careful in assembling the facts upon which they base
their case studies. Robertson eschews careful factual analysis and con
sequently fails to build a solid foundation for his argument. As early as
the Preface to his work, Robertson shows disregard for the need to
support debatable propositions. In the Preface, Robertson indicates
that it was the Holocaust that "called forth an international tribunal the court at Nuremberg" (p. xiv). This is not an absurd claim but it
cries out for support of some sort. None is forthcoming. A careful look
at the matter suggests that there were a number of other and stronger
motives for Nuremberg's creation, including Roosevelt's and
Stimson's concerns about revisionism, the strong American "legalistic-
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moralistic" mind set,51 Stalin's desire to destroy Nazi credibility, and a
number of others. As to the impact of the Holocaust, so centrally
placed a prosecutor as Telford Taylor has said that it was not until he
was in the midst of the Nuremberg trial that he began to appreciate
the "full scope of the Holocaust."52 Douglas documents the rising ap
peal of atrocity evidence over the course of the Nuremberg trial. It
was only as the trial neared its conclusion that the Holocaust moved
toward center stage. It is simply not good writing or thinking to breez
ily declare that Nuremberg was rooted in the Holocaust.
Robertson's lack of care extends to factual claims of less exalted
status as well. He states that the first (American) concentration camp
film shown at Nuremberg was "newsreels of Auschwitz and Belsen"
(p. 215). This description is wrong on several counts. The film was not
"newsreels" but the creation of Hollywood director George Stevens,
and it did not contain any footage showing Auschwitz.53 Similarly,
Robertson unqualifiedly states that "crucial documents" (p. 240) pre
sented at the Demjanjuk trial were forgeries (in context this can only
be read as a reference to the Trawniki document). The parties at the
Demjanjuk trial spent 8000 pages of transcript and more than 100
court sessions on that question. There is no consensus on the point,
though every American and Israeli court that ever ruled on the matter
found the Trawniki card genuine.54
Aside from documentation problems, Robertson's work is marred
by a simplistic heroes-and-villains view of events. Non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs") are virtually always on the side of the angels,
while diplomats and politicians are almost always venal. That this is
unfair to people like Madeleine Albright and David Scheffer, to name
but two, is rather clear. Robertson is also prone to fits of hyperbole.
He describes the Chilean dictator Augosto Pinochet as responsible for
" [t]he century's most vicious human rights violation" (p. 41). Such a
claim is simply absurd in light of the crimes of Hitler, Stalin, Mao, and
Pol Pot, to name but a few. This is not to suggest that Pinochet is an
innocent, but rather that a more finely calibrated argument might have
enhanced the credibility of Robertson's presentation. Given all of
these flaws, it is hard to credit Robertson's work. Fair description and
measured analysis are essential if we are to learn history's lessons.

51. GEORGE KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 1900-1950, at 95 (1951).
52. TAYLOR, supra note 14, at xi.
53. See DOUGLAS pp. 27-37 (providing a detailed description of the provenance and
content of Nazi Concentration Camps).
54.

See

TEICHOLZ, supra note 36, at 166-77, 251-56.
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III. Two SUGGESTIONS
About 25 years ago the great British historian, E.P. Thompson,
wrote Whigs and Hunters,55 a book describing a war that raged in the
forests and pastures of rural England in the 1710s and 1720s. That
struggle was mounted by small landholders and forest dwellers . in an
effort to protect their traditional rights in open or common land
against the property claims of Whig patricians who sought to seize and
enclose the land. The combatants were not well matched and the
wealthy won a good deal more often than they lost. Yet they did not
always win.56 Thompson, an avowed Marxist, began his study of this
woodland confrontation convinced that he would find that the law was
simply one more instrument by which the rich oppressed the poor.
What he found, however, surprised him. Although the well heeled of
ten succeeded, legal cases were not a sure thing for them and, in fact,
the law grew in ways that progressively hemmed in the options of the
powerful. Thompson, in the moving final chapter of his book, referred
to this process as the growth of the rule of law and saw it as the in
strumentality by which British society slowly and painfully grew to
ward true democracy. He also saw it as the wellspring of both
Gandhi's and Martin Luther King's power to overcome institutional
injustice.
One thing that is missing from Bass's and Douglas's otherwise ex
cellent works is any theory of why international law appears to be
growing into an ever more effective tool in punishing gross criminal
disregard for human rights. For Bass, what seems to be posited as an
explanation for recent developments is a convergence of factors that
foster prosecution. When these are not present, legal action should not
be expected to succeed. For Douglas, each case addressing the
Holocaust is presented as a more or less unique artifact that may suc
ceed or fail depending on the balance of forces pulling toward j uridical
limits and didactic narrative. What is missing from both these views is
any explanation or deeper appreciation of the apparent growth of in
ternational willingness to pursue criminals. Thompson's conception of
the growth of the rule of law provides a powerful insight into why
global receptivity has increased. It also helps us understand why the
trajectory of trial developments over time is important. That trajectory
or history can strengthen the limits on human rights abuse. The proc
ess, however, is not ineluctable. To encourage the growth of legal con-

55. EDWARD P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT
(1975)
.

56. See, e.g. , id. at 136 (tenants successful at Winchester Assizes on question of cutting
beech trees); id. at 51 (grand jury refused to indict local landowner accused of interfering
with red deer in Windsor); id. at 79 (despite vigorous prosecution, many defendants were
acquitted in criminal proceedings at Wallingford).
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straints, the importance of each case in reinforcing the power of law
must be appreciated. In this light, the risks inherent in the
Nuremberg/Eichmann approach must be recognized and corrected.
The fact that this was not done in cases like Demjanjuk threatens to
undermine progress.
One alternative to criminal trials discussed by all four authors is
the truth commission - a body charged with the duty of uncovering
the truth about certain historical events rather than prosecuting spe
cific defendants.57 The truth commission separates the second of the
two Nuremberg tracks from the effort to prosecute and makes the
creation of an accurate record an end in itself. The authors of all the
books under review are skeptical about the value of truth commissions
as a substitute for prosecutions.58 But all note that the truth commis
sion idea is one that has been repeatedly suggested and, sometimes,
tried. Bass reports that after World War I, when the British and
French were pushing for the prosecution of the Kaiser, the Americans
(who were opposed to the trial idea) proposed instead "an Interna
tional Commission of Inquiry be instituted to investigate and report
upon the extent of the responsibility of the ex-Kaiser" (p. 101). This
proposal was rejected as an unsatisfactory substitute for a trial, a con
clusion with which Bass seems to agree. Wilhelm II was never prose
cuted and no definitive record of World War I misdeeds was ever cre
ated.
Douglas too considers truth commission proposals, most particu
larly that made by Karl Jaspers in response to the Eichmann trial.
Jaspers saw the Eichmann case as presenting a problem beyond the
competence of a normal court of law and suggested that it might "be
wonderful to do without the trial altogether and make it instead into a
process of examination and clarification" (p. 175). Douglas rejects the
Jaspers proposal as lacking the legitimacy and closure of a true legal
proceeding. For Douglas, effective "pedagogy" (p. 175) cannot be
achieved by entities like truth commissions. He recognizes the risk of
distortion engendered by combining pedagogy with prosecution but
thinks such risks are worth taking - the Demjanjuk example notwith
standing. Goldstone for his part praises the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission ("TRC") as critical to that nation's transi
tion to democracy but is at pains to emphasize the special healing
power of ICTY prosecutions. Finally, Robertson dismisses truth com
missions as incapable of addressing serious human rights abuses. He
sees them as an inadequate response to extreme criminal conduct and
57. See generally
Comparative Study, 16

Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen
HUM. RTS. Q. 597 (1994).

Truth Commissions

-

1974 to 1994: A

58. The one possible exception is Justice Goldstone, who emphasizes the value of South
Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Pp. 59-73. He, however, highlights the need
for prosecutorial action in the Balkans. Pp. 74-119.
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declares "transitional justice [including truth commissions] is a contra
diction in terms" (pp. 270-71).
While there is merit to all the authors' criticisms of truth commis
sions, there is also a great deal to recommend such bodies. They may
be brought into being fairly quickly after transition to democracy or
the end of hostilities. They are not bound by the legal constraints that
require the highest standard of proof for individual conviction. In
situations where thousands of victims and potential defendants may
exist, truth commissions can address vast numbers of individuals and
help begin their reintegration into society. Goldstone makes this pre
cise point when he notes that the South African TRC heard 20,000 vic
tim witnesses and received 8,000 applications for amnesty. Goldstone
concludes that "the same result [could not] have been achieved
through the normal criminal process. It would have taken scores of
long and costly trials to have recorded the history of the human rights
abuses perpetrated during the apartheid era" (p. 71). With this back
ground in mind, Goldstone suggests that there might be a place for
both a truth commission and trials in the Balkans.
Out of this final Goldstone observation a new strategy with regard
to two-track trials might be formulated. Rather than encumber each
criminal trial with the costly and risky obligation of proving the vast
and complex nature of atrocity, why not use a single truth commission
proceeding for that purpose? Such a trial could fairly safely be con
ducted with relaxed evidence rules because no defendant would be di
rectly threatened by either erroneous factual findings or prejudice.
The commission charged with such a task would obviously need broad
investigative powers and ample staff. It would need both prosecutorial
and judicial independence from any interested party. It would also
need an effective defense staff comprised of appropriate interveners
and/or "devil's advocates" to guard against distortion and fabrications.
The findings of such a body might warrant judicial notice in later pro
ceedings. Such notice could operate in the manner contemplated by
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 - establishing certain propositions as
accurate and reliable.59 Room, however, might be left for an individual
defendant in a later case to challenge personally incriminating find
ings. Such a procedure could decouple the two-track process while
serving both prosecutorial and pedagogic goals.

59. See FED.

R. Evrn. 201.

